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1 THE POLICY CONTEXT. 
 
Since 1932 Ireland has had a policy of eliminating competition in bus 
transport. Similar policies were adopted in relation to road freight from 1933 to 1988, 
air transport from 1935 to 1986 and taxis from 1978 to 2000. Table 1 shows the 
transfer of 1098 independent bus services to the designated statutory transport 
companies between 1933 and 1941. 
 
TABLE 1:  Voluntary (V) and Compulsory (C) Transfers of Independent Bus Services to Statutory 
Transport Companies, 1933-1941. 
  To GSR  To GNR  To DUTV  Total 
  V C V C V C V C 
1933 459* 1  5  12  -  -  464 13 
1934 157  55  1  1  18 47  176  103 
1935  11 191  4  78  -  -  15 269 
1936 1 9 - - - 5 1  14 
1937  2 17 1  -  -  -  3 17 
1938 2 - - - - - 2 - 
1940 1 - - - - - 1 1 
1941 1 2 - - - - 1 2 
         633  419 
*446 licences held by a subsidiary company up to 31 December 1933. 
GSR: Great Southern Railways;  GNR; Great Northern Railways 
DUTC: Dublin United Tramways Company. 
Note: In addition to the 1082 services above transferred to the three main statutory transport companies 
there were 16 transfers to the remaining railway companies comprising 10 in 1934, 3 in 1935 and 3 in 
1938. The total of services transferred was therefore 1098 over the years 1933-1941. There were no 
transfers in 1939 to the three large companies above.  
 2 
 
(2) THE RATIONALE FOR PROHIBITING BUS COMPETITION. 
 
The goal of government intervention to prohibit bus competition was to 
protect the railways from competition. The pressures on government to curtail the 
independent bus sector increased steadily from the late 1920s onwards.  At the annual 
general meetings of the largest railway company, Great Southern Railways, in 1926 
and 1928 the chairman complained that road transport competitors enjoyed unfair 
advantages in their tax treatment and freedom of operation. In 1930 the chairman 
defended the purchase of the Irish Omnibus Company on the grounds that it would ' 
eliminate wasteful competition." (Barrett, 1982,12). In 1931 the chairman called for 
the regulation of road transport in order to protect the railways. " It is obvious, 
moreover, that unless legislation is passed regulating transport and removing the 
disabilities at present imposed on the railways the companies cannot continue to 
adequately maintain and operate them” At the 1932 annual general meeting the 
chairman claimed that "nowhere in the world was the whole matter of road and rail 
competition allowed to drift as it has been, until quite recently, in Great Britain or the 
Irish Free State." (Barrett, 1982,3). 
In 1927 the Railways (Road Motor Services) Act allowed railway companies 
to operate road services under conditions set by the Minister for Industry and 
Commerce. According to Shields the restrictions were based on the assumption that 
the railways " would gain a virtual monopoly of transport as a result of their great 
financial resources and general economic and strategic position in the country. This 
fear, a relic of nineteenth century railway legislation, should not have existed in view 
of the fact that numerous privately owned commercial road services, unfettered by 
legislation had begun to entrench themselves as public road carriers." (Shields, 
1936/7, 91/92). 
The prevailing climate in economic policy is seen in  Conroy's statement  that ' 
it would not be inconsistent with this age of "trusts" and "combines" that all 
competition in the transport world should be eliminated ... Road transport should be 
merely used as a substitute for rail transport , not as  a substitute for it." (Conroy, 
1928,370).  In introducing the Road Transport Act, 1932, the Minister for Industry 
and Commerce, Mr McGilligan told the Dail (parliament) that while the tendency in 
the Act was " to divert traffic into the hands of the three transport companies  
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operating on a big scale at present... we do allow for the existence side by side with 
these three agencies on the independent bus proprietor or company. Personally, l look 
forward to seeing these people disappearing by degrees either by process of 
amalgamation with other companies or by the main companies deciding that their 
future lay in certain areas in the country and leaving other areas for exploitation by 
independent bus owners." (PDDE, 40, 2632-7). The prevailing thinking was applied 
to road transport a year later by a new government. Introducing the Road Transport 
Act, 1933, the Minister for Industry and Commerce, Mr Lemass, stated that the object 
was " to make it possible for the Great Southern Railway in its area and other railways 
in their areas to establish themselves in what is described as a monopoly position." 
(PDSE, 16,979). 
The Transport Tribunal in 1939 estimated that the number of passengers 
carried by the independent bus companies under the 1932 Transport Act was reduced 
from 34.5 million to 1 million per year and the market share reduction from 46% to 
0.92%. (1939,13-4).  The number of passengers carried on the Great Southern 
Railways in 1931 was 11.9m, compared to 15.5m in 1926. 
The interventions of two successive Irish governments on behalf of the 
railways and against independent bus and road freight companies is attributed to four 
factors; the successful lobbying of the railways resulting in regulatory capture of the 
regulatory arm of government by the railway lobby, the interventionist tradition in 
economic affairs of Irish nationalism, the interventions induced by the recession in 
1929 in most countries and the lack of economic knowledge of the consequences of 
regulation. (Barrett,2000, 56-8). 
The ability of sectors to secure government legislation to restrain their 
competitors is known as regulatory capture. (Levine, 1998,267).  Levine notes also 
that ordinarily, the welter of information that the public receives about political issues 
from the media and the difficulties of organizing to achieve political ends insulate 
regulators from monitoring and general-interest pressure.'  An exception, however, 
was the US Airline Deregulation Act, 1978.  Following Senator Kennedy's hearings, " 
the cost to the public of being informed on the issues and influencing government 
dropped dramatically.... Capture became nearly impossible, and the US airline 
industry was unable to stave off a deregulation it strongly opposed." (270).  
The interventionist Irish political culture is amenable to regulatory capture. 
According to Daly, "one major legacy of the thirties was the institutionalisation of an  
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Irish dependence on the state, and on politicians, for economic benefits." (Daly, 
1982,4). 
Th e current deregulation movement is a rejection of the to be " partly an echo 
of the regulatory movement of the 1930s which was a response to the Great 
Depression, when the securities, airline, banking, and many other industries became 
regulated."  
The fourth factor explaining the success of lobbying for protectionism in 
Ireland in the 1930s was the weak position of the study and practice of economics in 
the country at the time. University departments of economics were small and had little 
influence on government departments (Fanning, 1985). It was not until 1950 that 
economists were employed in the civil service and in the initial stages they were 
confined to the Department of Finance. 
 
(3) THE INDEPENDENT BUS SECTOR AFTER 1932. 
 
The CSO series on the earnings of bus companies shows that the number of 
companies rose from 96 in 1928 to 145 in 1932. It then declined rapidly to 38 in 1938 
and 34 in 1941. (Irish Statistical Bulletin).  Local bus services were left unacquired by 
the railway companies mostly in remote areas of the country.  The Milne Report in 
1948 found that there were 28 independent bus operators.  "These licences are issued 
only at the discretion of the Minister and in practice have only been granted in cases 
where there was no public service and no existing operator was prepared to provide 
one. No new entrant has been granted a licence since 1940. " (1948, 22). The Beddy 
Report in 1957 also found " 28 small operators holding passenger licences in respect 
of regular omnibus services. (1957, 120/1).  Beddy estimated that they carried 1.2 
million passengers in 1955.  
In the Dail in 1979 the Minister for Transport and Tourism stated that in the 
previous two years eleven applications for new passenger licences were refused 
because he existing services were judged to be adequate. The Minister stated that CIE 
was consulted in every case and that he did not consider that there would be any 
justification for an appeal to an independent arbitrator 
Barrett in 1980 found that the fares charged by these operators for journeys 
between 19 and 32 miles were 63% of the CIE fare. (1982,130). This fare comparison 
was based on the Dublin-Drogheda fare charged by CIE with the independent  
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operators' fares on the routes between Clonmel and Thurles, Athlone and Mullingar, 
Cavan and Longford and Urlingford and Kilkenny.   
The ban on bus competition covered individual stage carriage only.  Private 
hire group travel by bus was exempt from the 1932 legislation. Sporting fixtures, 
school trips, services to dances and bingo and shopping trips provided the bulk of the 
private hire business for the independent bus services. The sector gained from the 
establishment of the school bus service in 1967 when the independents were allowed 
to sub-contract routes from CIE but not to tender directly to the Department of 
Education.  
Barrett (1982) estimated that bus competition on a main route such as Dublin- 
Cork would reduce the return fare to a range between £4.80 and £5.40 return from a 
rail fare of £27 normal and £13.50 excursion. The bus fare assumed 80% occupancy 
and undercut the excursion rail fare by 60%. (1980,130/1). 
The Green Paper on Transport Policy (1985) noted that  "there are operators 
who provide what are regular service type operations using "private hire" through 
"travel club" arrangements, as a basis for claiming immunity from the requirements of 
the road transport legislation. Despite successful prosecutions , business has increased 
over the years and the services are now well established."  The Green Paper also noted 
that there were thirty-eight operators licensed to operate over 105 routes.  " Mot of 
these routes were short rural routes. Regular services (e.g. daily, weekly) are provided 
on 70 routes while occasional services (e.g. trips to seaside, dances etc.) operate over 
the remaining 35 routes."  The Green Paper stated that " the general policy has been to 
refuse an application for a licence where there is an existing CIE service or a service 
by a licensed operator, unless it can be shown that the proposed service would meet a 
need not being met by the existing service."  
According to Conlon, " the number of unlicensed weekend operators doubled 
between 1983 and 1986 while the number of unlicensed daily services trebled in the 
same period. In 1986 there were 56 operators with 115 vehicles operating unlicensed 
weekend services and 44 operators with 68  vehicles operating unlicensed daily 
services." (1988). 
In the late 1980s Bus Eireann began to enter the express bus market. 
Successes were achieved in eliminating private sector competitors on routes to Dublin 
from Cork, Tralee, Mayo, Sligo and Meath. On the other hand substantial private 
sector bus services have survived in the south midlands, Galway, Donegal, Monaghan  
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and Cavan.  The most competitive route is Dublin-Galway which in the summer of 
2000 had 26 services a day, 13 by CIE, 8 by Citylink and 5 by Nestors. 
 
(4) PROPOSALS FOR REGULATORY REFORM 1985-2000.  
 
The 1985 Green Paper on Transport Policy presented sets of six arguments for 
and against liberalisation of bus services.  The arguments for liberalisation were as 
follows- 
(1) customers would benefit from competition in fare levels and quality of service; 
(2) market supply would adjust to passenger demand, thereby producing more 
effective and economical use of transport resources; 
(3) would challenge CIE and its staff, giving them an opportunity to respond to 
competition in the market; 
(4) a licensing system would provide a means for controlling the very considerable 
transport operations that are at present legally doubtful 
(5) would encourage experiments with minibuses and small buses, particularly as 
replacements on routes where the use of large buses is uneconomic due to low levels 
of demand; 
(6) Success of private operators would help to convince CIE to withdraw from certain 
areas (or services), thereby leading to improved CIE financial performance; also 
increased competition might help the railways to be more cost-effective. 
In the list of benefits item (4) above is wrongly included. Liberalisation 
benefits an economy by fewer, not more, controls. The remaining benefits have been 
seen in the de facto liberalisations of the bus market on routes such as Dublin-
Galway.  The market was developed by the private sector as an alternative to an 
infrequent stopping service run by CIE as a monopolist. The market has grown to 26 
services a day in each direction and fares are as low as £5 for the 136 mile journey, 
3.7p per mile. The Dublin-Galway fare per mile is only 47% of the 7.8p per mile fare 
charged from Dublin to Cork which has no competition and the fare £13.50.  The 
savings from actual competition on the Dublin-Galway route, over 50%, are 
approximately twice the savings from bus tendering as indicated in the OECD report 
on regulatory reform in Ireland. (2001, 37). 
The Green Paper's arguments against liberalisation were as follows;  
 7 
(1) risk that unrestricted competition would adversely affect the quality of service, 
with safety implications; 
(2) full liberalisation might lead to gaps in service rather than an integrated network; 
(3) operators would concentrate on routes with high demand, leaving CIE to serve the 
low demand routes; 
(4) benefits of cross-subsidisation within CIE would be eroded, as CIE reduced fares 
on well supported routes in order to retain traffic; 
(5) possibility of a reduction in CIE staff on foot of a fall in demand for CIE services, 
with redundancy and other cost implications; 
(6) competition would reduce CIE's share of bus traffic, in the short term at least, and 
possibly cause a further fall in rail passenger levels. This would adversely affect CIE's 
financial position, and would lead to its having to reduce costs(by eliminating and/or 
reducing uneconomic services. 
In the event no White Paper or legislation followed the Green Paper of 1985. 
The arguments against liberalisation apparently prevailed. The inclusion in (6) above 
of CIE "having to reduce costs" as an argument against liberalisation is obviously 
misplaced since a major gain from liberalisations is to secure cost reductions from the 
previous monopolists. 
The other arguments against liberalisation, while successful in preventing 
legislative change, are not supported by analysis.  Liberalisation refers to removing of 
barriers to entry to the sector and safety regulation such as vehicle testing and  drivers' 
hours regulations would remain.  The value of an integrated network may mean little 
to passengers seeking cheap point to point transport. Airline liberalisation has allowed 
the growth both of airlines with an integrated network and those selling point to point 
tickets only. (Doganis, 2000, 72;127) 
Cross-subsidisation by monopolists is a transfer from passengers on routes 
where price exceeds costs to other routes where costs exceed price. There is no net 
gain to passengers.  
The protection of labour-intensive enterprises such as public transport as a 
means to securing employment in the protected companies imposes substantial hidden 
costs on the economy and these costs are difficult to justify in a full employment 
economy such as Ireland in recent years. Labour hoarding should be discouraged 
rather than promoted.  
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The National Development Plan (1989-93) promised to 'replace the outdated 
Road Transport Act, 1932. The planned changes will bring in the liberalisation of the 
bus industry to provide greater competition and increased flexibility in the range of 
services'.  The matter was not pursued however until the publication of A New 
Institutional Framework for Public Transport in August 2000. 
The New Institutional and Regulatory Framework (NIRF) proposals may be 
summarised as follows; 
(1) the public transport market will be opened up to private participation as a way of 
better exposing it to market forces, improving quality and efficiency, increasing 
attention to customer requirements and reducing the cost of service provision;(p.8) 
(2) state financial support will be provided on a contractual basis, specifying the 
payments to be made for a defined quantity and quality of service; (8) 
(3) Bus Atha Cliath and Bus Eireann will be established as separate independent 
companies and the existing geographical restrictions on their areas of competition will 
be removed;(9) 
(4) Bus Atha Cliath will be privatised and the future privatisation of Bus Eireann is 
'not being ruled out.' (10) 
(5) "Implementation issues" cited were the financial implications for the Exchequer of 
improved public transport services and restructuring the CIE companies; "substantial  
industrial relations issues"; the pensions of those in the CIE holding company; the 
right of staff to transfer back to CIE when a subsidiary is wound up; possible share 
ownership by staff in the restructured CIE companies and the financial restructuring 
of the individual CIE companies including reallocation to them of loans and assets 
from the CIE group. (12). 
(6) The bus service " will be one element of an integrated transportation strategy for 
the Greater Dublin area." (14).  It will from " part of an integrated network of public 
transport services" (14) and "will participate fully in an integrated ticketing system" 
(14). 
(7) "Contracts or franchises will be awarded to the winning tenders who will have 
exclusive rights to operate services on particular routes or in defined geographical 
areas for a specific period of time (say 5 years)." (15) 
(8) "the winning tenderer will either make a payment to the State to operate the 
specified services on an exclusive basis or receive a subvention" (15-16) 
(9)"in line with the intention to franchise routes or groups of routes,  interim  
 9 
 licences will be restricted to one operator per route." (18) 
(10)" it is assumed that the proposed Bill ( to allocate subsidy through public service 
contracts) will be able to provide for exclusive rights in respect of the existing core 
networks of Bus Atha Cliath and Bus Eireann as necessary." (18) 
(11)the new bus regulatory body for  the Dublin area will have power to refuse licence 
applications not consistent with the overall transportation strategy; to terminate a 
licence in order to introduce a franchising scheme in respect of particular routes or 
geographical area or where the existing licensee is not providing an adequate service.; 
to attach conditions to licences such as participation in an integrated ticketing scheme 
or sharing of bus infrastructure(19) and to investigate and take enforcement action in 
respect of any abuse of dominant position jointly with the Competition Authority with 
each body 'given an express right to defer to the other's consideration of a matter that 
otherwise falls within its own broad jurisdiction." (18). 
 
(5) ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE NIRF PROPOSALS. 
 
NIRF proposes exclusivity on routes with competition every five years for 
routes. It protects the "existing core networks of Bus Atha Cliath and Bus Eireann as 
necessary."  The range of choice offered to passengers on the deregulated bus services 
between Dublin and Galway might itself be reduced under a purported liberalisation 
programme. The possibility of competition on other routes is closed off by the NIRF 
proposals. The consumer is thus denied the normal gains from having a  choice of 
supplier of goods or services such as price and service competition. 
The weakness of the consumer position under the NIRF proposals can be seen 
by examining the position of wishing to change his present supplier of public 
transport services. His redress is to petition the licensing authority to seek 
improvements in the present service and not to renew the licence when the five year 
period has expired. In the short term the dissatisfied passenger may transfer to another 
bus route in the hope that the monopolist there may provide a better service. This 
possibility is reduced when groups of routes are franchised and reduced even further 
when core networks are protected from both franchise and "on the road" competition. 
New entrants face refusal of licences from bodies such as the new bus   
regulatory body for the Dublin area. Additional barriers to entry are proposed such as 
participation in an integrated ticketing operation. and the requirement to pay the  
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government in return for licences. The contrasting model is the provision of cheap 
point to point transport as shown in the present long distance bus competition in 
Ireland and the concentration of cheap point to point transport rather than an 
integrated network by airlines such as Ryanair. 
New entrants will face the likelihood of market dominance by the two CIE 
companies, Bus Eireann and Bus Atha Cliath, both created not by market forces but 
by legislation to secure the abolition of competing bus companies by compulsion if 
necessary.  In the United Kingdom the National Bus Company was privatised in small 
sections in order to reduce the danger of market dominance. In view of the evidence 
of market dominance in the sector in the United Kingdom in recent years the 
weakness of the NIRF provisions to deal with this problem is surprising.  
NIRF shows substantial evidence of regulatory capture in its concern with 
implementation issues, all of which raised in the document refer to the protection of 
the legislative position of CIE since 1932.  There is little consideration, on the other 
hand, of the gains to consumers and to society as a whole, from deregulated markets.  
 
(6) COMPETITION FOR THE BUS MARKET VERSUS COMPETITION IN THE 
BUS MARKET. 
 
The NIRF model of competition for the market instead of competition in the 
market is derived from the work of Demsetz in Why Regulate Utilities? (1968). The 
Demsetz model  seeks the benefits of competition by tendering for the market where 
there are obstacles to competition in the market. Thus for example, competition 
between electricity generating companies would take place in tendering for the supply 
of electricity to the national distribution grid instead of each customer being wired up 
directly by each of the competing electricity generating companies.  
In the air traffic control sector competitive tendering for the operation of 
control towers brings competition to a sector whereas airlines shopping around 
between competing control towers is impracticable.  Similarly in the 
telecommunications, television and radio sectors the limit on the availability of 
transmission capacity was cited as the reason why alternative ways of allocating 
frequencies and capacities either by auction or by applications in accordance with 
government stipulated criteria.  
 11 
The policy implications of contestable markets are that governments should 
not ban new entrants and should remove obstacles to competition.  Prospective 
entrants ensure the efficiency of incumbents because they know that  if  they  set price  
too high a price this  will attract new entrants.  Monopolists both charge too much and 
produce too little and earn economic rents or allocatively unnecessary payments. 
These economic rents may be absorbed in high costs and low productivity or result in 
supernormal profits. 
The Department of Public Enterprise, publishers of the NIRF document, has 
experience of the models of competition both in the market and for the market. A key 
question in regard to the NIRF document is whether its choice of competition for 
rather than in the market was the correct one. 
NIRF states that  "it is clear that the franchising model is the optimal 
regulatory solution to manage the development of the core urban bus network" (17) 
but does not explain why on the road competition has been rejected. NIRF 
acknowledges however that "other regulatory approaches may be more appropriate 
when considering the bus market, say, in smaller towns on the periphery or key radial 
commuter routes from the hinterland into the city centre. The independent regulatory 
function will have appropriate flexibility to develop alternative regulatory approaches 
for these very different markets." (17).    NIRF thus rejects competition in the major 
urban bus markets without giving reasons for a policy which requires some 
justification. Bus companies competed in Ireland before the state intervened to 
prevent them doing so in 1932.  Truck companies have competed since 1988 and 
airlines since 1986 and bus competition applies on routes such as Dublin-Galway.  To 
the consumer all three cases of competition in the transport sector have been highly 
successful. It is not obvious why NIRF does not want to extend that success to the bus 
sector. It is not clear why NIRF recommends possible competition in some small bus 
markets but rules it out in large urban markets. 
NIRF also avoids the policy decision on where competition might be allowed 
outside the protected core networks of the CIE companies. NIRF allocates to "the 
independent regulatory function" the policy of deciding whether competition may take 





(7) BUS DEREGULATION IN BRITAIN. 
 
The first deregulation of bus services in Britain was the long distance sector in 
1980. Fares fell by 35 to 40% following deregulation. (ECMT, 1988,10). Seven 
hundred new services were introduced (Buses, 11). The White Paper also noted that  
"the NBC National Express services have been dominant in this area, the number of 
passengers carried increasing by 45% between 1980 and 1983. 
The dominance of National Express increased when its largest competitor, 
British Coachways, withdrew in 1983. Prices rose in real terms and by 1985 " in 
aggregate, prices were slightly lower in real terms than immediately before 
deregulation. This fall in real price marks a departure from previous trends. In the past 
the regulated bus industry has been characterised by slow productivity growth which 
has been associated with rising real costs and prices.' ( Jaffer and Thompson, 1986, 
62).They conclude that "the introduction of competition in sectors formerly the 
preserve of state monopolies is worthwhile" but that "effective competition requires 
an effective competition policy." (65). 
The main barriers to competition in the deregulation of intercity coach 
services were the exclusion of new entrants from coach stations owned by the 
National Bus Company, the market power of the National Bus Company n operating 
in protected markets before the deregulation of local bus services in 1986, and the 
weak bankruptcy constraint on the National Bus Company as a public company. 
In the 1986 deregulation of bus services outside the London area the 
privatisation of the National Bus Company removed the weak bankruptcy constraint 
and market dominance was tackled by splitting the company into fifty-two separate 
bus companies, six coach operating companies, and eight engineering companies. In 
addition National Express, National Travelworld, and the coach station subsidiary 
were sold as separate companies. (Vickers and Yarrow, l988,374).  
In 1985 transport in Britain lost its exemption from the Restrictive Practices 
Act. It may be investigated by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in matters such as 
fares collusion between bus companies. "The crunch will come if and when OFT 
decides that remaining agreements are restrictive and proceeds to their determination 
by the Restrictive Practices Court. " (Beesley, 1989, 35).  
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Local bus service deregulation in October 1986 was examined over its first 
year by the Transport and Road Research Laboratory (TRRL). The authors Balcombe,  
Hopkins, and Penet,  (1988) found the following results 
 - some increase in bus kilometres; 
 - about 85 per cent of vehicle-kilometres were operated commercially; 
- fares were largely unaffected by deregulation; 
- initial reduction in patronage; 
-a reduction in subsidies; 
- a substantial increase in the number of operators; 
-greater competition between operators; 
- innovations such as the greater use of minibuses; 
-no change in safety standards. 
A two year assessment of bus deregulation was published by Beesley (1989) 
in an European Conference of Ministers of Transport round table on The Role of 
Government in a Deregulated Market.   The data are taken from the series Transport 
Statistics of Great Britain (TSGB). 
(1) Bus kilometres; In 1987/88 there were 2,342 million local stage bus kilometres, 
compared with 2,076 million in 1985/86, the last full pre-deregulation year. The 
increase was therefore 13%. The 1987/88 output reversed a decline in output 
throughout the 1980s. (Transport Statistics of Great Britain (TSGB), table 2.36) 
(2) Social service bus transport: 349 million vehicle-kilometres of bus travel out of 
the total of 2,343 million were provided under subsidy, that is 14.9%.  The separation 
of the commercial network from the social services network ensures that subsidies are 
used only on routes where the service would not be provided commercially. (TSGB, 
table 2.37). 
(3)Fares; The fares index for all operators with a base year of 1985 = 100 increased 
from 110.1 in the July-September quarter in 1986 to 112.7 in January-March 1987. 
These are the quarters before and after deregulation in October 1986.(TSGB, table 
2.38.) 
(4)Service: The loss of service did not persist throughout the first year. There were 
2,076 million vehicle-kilometres in 1985/86 and 2,160 million in 1986/87, an increase 
of 4% (TSGB, table 2.38). 
(5) Patronage:  The number of passengers carried was 5,641 million in 1985/86; it 
declined to 5,332 million in 1986/87 and increased slightly to 5,340 million in  
 14 
1987/88 (TSGB, table 2.37). Before deregulation the number of passengers fell from 
6,864 million in 1977 to 5,461 million in 1985/86. 
(6) Subsidies:  Revenue support grants for bus companies increased from £225m in 
1979/80 to £465m in 1985/86. After deregulation they declined to £365m in 1988/89 
(TSGB, table 1.19).  
(7) Operators: There were 5,600 operators in the private sector before deregulation 
and there was a net increase of 465 operators by May 1988.  
(8) Competition: The increase in competition is reflected in the increase of 13% in 
bus kilometres and 8% in the number of private bus operators. 
(9) Innovations: In 1980 small vehicles with up to 35 seats comprised 8% of the fleet 
of 69,100 vehicles. By 1985/86 the accounted for 14% of 67,900 vehicles. After 
deregulation the small bus fleet increased to 15,900, or 22% of the fleet of 71,700 
(TSGB, table 2.40). 
(10) Accidents: The accident rate per 100 million vehicle miles for buses and coaches 
was 395 in 1980, 333 in 1986 and 292 in 1988. For all vehicles the rates were 152 in 
1980, 129 in 1986 and 120 in 1988 (TSGB, table 2.48). Taking 1980 as an index of 
100, the accident involvement rate both for buses and vehicles as a whole declined to 
84 in 1986. Since bus deregulation the accident rate for all vehicles has fallen to 79 
while the rate for buses has fallen further to 74. 
(11) Productivity:As shown at (1) above the output of the sector in terms of vehicle-
kilometres increased by 13% in the first full year o deregulation. The staff numbers 
declined in the same period from 174.3 thousand to 158.8 thousand, a decline of 9%. 
There was thus an increase of 24% in bus-kilometres per staff member.  
 
(8) COMPETITION POLICY AND BUS DEREGULATION IN BRITAIN. 
 
In transport deregulation a major problem has been the use of predatory 
pricing and the weakness of response by regulatory authorities in applying 
competition policy to transport. Beesley (198) states that NBC's ability to harass 
competition was even greater than the commentators appreciated. Its nationalised 
status was a help in pursuing what would be judged by most anti-trust standards as 
competitive dubious practices. Vickers and Yarrow found that " the National Express 
policy bears some sign of a campaign of predatory pricing but, whether or. not this is 
so, the competition authorities stood by and did nothing." (1988, 374).  
 15 
Pryke, Dodgson and Katsoulacos (1991) admit the difficulty in identifying 
predation in transport because pricing to fill empty seats may be difficult to 
distinguish from pricing to drive out competitors. However, they list as factors to 
examine in cases of reported predation areas such as timetable matching, significant 
fare increases after market exit by a competitor and operation of services at a loss 
during the period of competition. 
In examining the possible monopoly position of Stagecoach in Hastings and 
Portsmouth, Wolmar notes that " the Monopolies and Mergers Commission reports, 
as usual, were published nearly a year after the referrals, restricting the scope for 
action without further disruption to the local bus markets." (1998;71). The MMC 
recommended that if a future competitor came in, and Stagecoach responded by 
slashing its fares, the company would have to retain those fare levels even after the 
competition disappeared. 
Wolmar found that the "local (bus) battles normally followed a similar pattern, 
with a period of fare cutting, rear-mirror scheduling ( waiting for the rival bus  behind 
to turn up and then leaving the stop), buses leaping in front of each other between 
stops and massive overprovision. Typically, both operators would lose money and 
eventually, after a few months, one would withdraw bloodied and beaten. And it was 
rarely Stagecoach, given its superior resources and its readiness to keep harrying its 
opponents. Later, when Stagecoach's reputation spread, operators facing an attack 
would simply withdraw at the mere hint that the Perth-based company was coming to 
town or threatening an attack." (79). The MMC report on Stagecoach in the 
Darlington area found  the behaviour of Stagecoach 'deplorable, predatory and against 
the public interest." (1995). 
 
(9) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 
 
The NIRF document continues a strong tradition in Irish transport policy of 
prohibition on competition. Its limited proposals for a small amount of competition 
from the private sector through "franchise competitions for private operators in 
respect of routes not in the existing Bus Atha Cliath or Bus Eireann core network." 
(NIRF, 18).  The NIRF document cites "recent Senior Counsel's advice that public 
service contracts may only be granted to the CIE companies without a competition in 
the basis of an exclusive right which they enjoy in law and that this exclusive right is  
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not de facto eroded by the existence of private operators in the market served by the 
companies. It is assumed that the proposed Bill will be able to provide for exclusive 
rights in respect of the existing core networks of Bus Atha Cliath and Bus Eireann as 
necessary." (NIRF,18). 
The limited competition for exclusive rights to operate on non "core network" 
routes of Bus Atha Cliath and Bus Eireann contrasts with competition on routes with 
consumer choice between competing bus companies, as recommended here over the 
entire commercial bus services market. 
The failure to permit market forces in Irish public transport involves excess 
costs to users, creates economic rents for producers and signifies regulatory capture of 
the government as regulator by the protected company. The Minister for Public 
Enterprise is the sole shareholder in CIE, the protected company, and the regulator 
who regulates the market in favour of that company and intends to continue to do so. 
The payment of substantial public transport subsidies in Ireland implies 
market failure to be corrected by government intervention.  There is no mechanism to 
pay any subsidy to a road transport operator other than CIE. The State has not 
designated any social service transport as provided for in the Transport Act, 1944, 
section 48. CIE has not made any application under section 18 of the Transport Act, 
1958 which relieved it of its common carrier obligations through a procedure under 
which other operators. 
The State as owner of CIE and protector of its monopolistic position  both in 
the marketplace and in eligibility for public subsidisation has imposed large costs on 
the customer, the wider economy and on the actual and potential private sector in 
passenger transport.  
The gains from deregulation in other areas of transport are ignored in the 
NIRF proposals. The precedents elsewhere indicate that these dynamic impacts 
elsewhere in the Irish economy have been very large.  Before the liberalisation of Irish 
road freight began in 1970 there were 1,051 licensed haulage vehicles in the hired 
haulage fleet. In 1998 there were 10,146 licensed haulage vehicles in the fleet. 
The deregulation of taxi services resulted in an increase in vehicles in the fleet 
between November 21,2000 and March 31,2001 from 3,922 to 7,775, a 98% increase. 
The increase in Dublin was 109%, Cork 92%, Galway 70%, Limerick 74% and 
Waterford, 110%.       
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The deregulation of air services between Ireland and Britain was the most 
spectacular of any major airline deregulation. The unrestricted fare between Dublin 
and London fell by 54% on deregulation in May 1986. The number of passengers in 
August 1987, the first full year of deregulation, was 92% greater than in August 1985, 
the last full year of pre-deregulation policies. Ireland is the first case of a deregulation 
airline, Ryanair, exceeding the passenger numbers carried by the national airline, Aer 
Lingus. 
The ban on new entrants to the bus sector has restricted private bus companies 
to a handful of licensed routes not wanted by CIE and to the private hire sector. Since 
the CIE subsidy is not earmarked to specific routes there is no mechanism to prevent 
it being used as a war chest in CIE's campaign against the private bus sector.  
CIE's dominance covers both the market sector from which its rivals are 
excluded at its behest and the nonmarket sector in which it has sole access to 
exchequer subsidies. No structures exist  to restrict the abuse of this dominance by 
CIE through tactics such as predatory pricing, timetable matching and the cross 
subsidisation of routes on which there is competition from those where there is no 
competition. CIE is a substantial buyer-in of bus services from the private sector for 
both the school bus service which it controls, and hiring in extra buses for scheduled 
services thus producing a private sector unable to engage in competition with CIE. 
The income of CIE from all sources exceeds £600m per year whereas few private 
operators exceed £1m a year.  
While the NIRF proposes the sale of Bus Atha Cliath there are no proposals to 
sell Bus Eireann, the public bus company which faces more private sector 
competition.  Divestiture of both companies should be considered. Measures to 
reduce market dominance such as splitting up the state companies and tackling 
predation techniques should also be considered. They are weak in the NIRF 
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